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McCall makes some excellent points about monotheism and the Trin-
ity. It won’t imply monotheism, he says, to say merely that there’s one 
generic divine essence, that there’s only one divine “family,” that there’s 
only one font of divinity (the Father), or that the Three are united by a 
mysterious relation of “periochoresis” (241–242). Amen to all that.
My biggest criticism of the book is its friendliness towards theoretical 
solutions, which crucially depend on bold, arguably ad hoc re-definitions. 
Yet it is clearly written, sober, insightful, and rich with argument. As in-
tended, it gives theologians and philosophers some important things to 
argue about together.
Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, ed. Oliver D. 
Crisp and Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 316. 
$45 (paperback).
PAUL C. ANDERS, Mount Marty College
This is an important and informative collection of essays that I expect will 
be highly influential, and which I highly recommend. However, reading 
these essays is somewhat frustrating. The frustration centers on a set of 
interrelated ambiguities that run throughout the collection. Some of these 
ambiguities are unavoidable, but others should be disambiguated and are 
not, at least not to the degree one might expect from an analytic treatment 
of analytic theology. In what follows, I focus on two concerns: just what 
constitutes analytic theology and whether analytic theology is meant to be 
only descriptive, or normative as well.
In the introduction, Michael Rea makes two important distinctions. 
First, while analytic theology is based on the methods of analytic phi-
losophy, these methods are applied not to natural language analysis as 
in early analytic philosophy, but to metaphysical systems or worldviews. 
Second, to refer to the methods of analytic philosophy in contemporary 
usage is more about a particular style of philosophy with an associated 
set of desiderata—clarity, rigor, and logical argumentation being fun-
damental. As such, analytic theology can allow for much variety with 
respect to content and method. Analytic theology may be better thought 
of as an attitude toward theological methods as opposed to a way of do-
ing theology.
The first two essays in part one are focused on the nature of analytic 
theology, but are less than direct in their conclusions concerning normativ-
ity. In “On Analytic Theology,” Thomas Crisp uses a distinction by Peter 
Strawson between descriptive and revisionist metaphysics. Descriptive 
metaphysics seeks merely to understand the current status of a conceptual 
system. Revisionist metaphysics offers an alternative to the current system. 
Crisp envisions analytic theology as descriptive partly because it seeks to 
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remain within the theological traditions of the church catholic. But this 
is misleading. Using Strawson’s distinction, a descriptive metaphysic may 
also be a corrective if the current system has broken from traditional un-
derstandings. In this way, as Crisp seems to envision it, analytic theology 
is both descriptive and revisionist. While Crisp seems to move toward this 
sort of normative account, he closes his essay reiterating only a descriptive 
approach.
In the second essay, “Systematic Theology as Analytic Theology,” Wil-
liam Abraham defines analytic theology in terms of the skills, resources, 
virtues and insights of analytic philosophy. However, he does not articu-
late them in any detail. Still, he seems to support a normative account 
when he claims that “we need the help of analytic theology to do justice 
to the God we meet in the worship of the Church” (61). Abraham believes 
“the time is ripe” for analytic theology and that it “will bear much fruit 
in the years ahead” (69). However, Abraham focuses on an epistemology 
of theology that can give an account of truth, evidence, justification, and 
warrant as they apply to systematic theology, and here an analytic ap-
proach may be of great benefit. But if a theologian need not be concerned 
with these epistemic considerations, an analytic approach will be only 
one avenue a theologian may choose.
Clearly, in “Theology as Bull Session,” Randal Rauser sees analytic 
theology as a needed corrective to what have become the standard meth-
ods of modern theology. Rauser focuses on two influential accounts in 
modern theology, Sallie McFague’s theology as persuasive metaphor, 
and Jürgen Moltmann’s theology as perpetual conversation. Based on the 
recent analysis of bullshit by Frankfurt and others, Rauser argues that 
these accounts convey the kind of skepticism that is inherent in modern 
theology and that gives rise to theological bullshit. For Rauser, an analytic 
approach can bring theology out of the bull session and reestablish it as a 
productive form of inquiry. However, what analytic theology involves is 
not discussed with any precision.
The historical investigations of part two are all very interesting but a bit 
perplexing as to the state of analytic theology. In “A Conception of Faith in 
the Greek Fathers,” John Lamont makes it quite clear that much theologi-
cal investigation into the nature of faith has had a strong analytic flavor. 
Of course, the prevailing attitude behind much contemporary theology is 
that Kant ended the kind of analytic work on which Lamont is focused. 
However, in “‘As Kant has Shown . . .’: Analytic Theology and the Critical 
Philosophy,” Andrew Chignell brings into question the hardline interpre-
tation of Kant’s work that sees in it the impossibility of one having knowl-
edge, or speaking meaningfully, of God. Chignell argues that a moder-
ate reading of Kant’s claims regarding propositions about supersensible 
objects allows for a productive fit between analytic theology and “what 
Kant has shown.” The result of such analytic theology will be “moral,” or 
acceptable, belief instead of knowledge, but acceptable belief concerning 
God should certainly be important to the analytic theologian.
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While this reading of Kant undermines much of the modern theological 
criticism of analytic theology, it also has a less positive effect. On this read-
ing, analytic theology can be done in a Kantian vein. In “How Philosophical 
Theology Became Possible within the Analytic Tradition of Philosophy,” 
Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that the analytic approach may be more in 
keeping with Kant’s critical philosophy than is much of modern theology. 
This substantially broadens the possibilities of what can be analytic theol-
ogy. The already vague understanding of analytic theology becomes that 
much more nebulous.
However, in “Schleiermacher’s Theological Anti-Realism,” Andrew 
Dole does set some boundaries for the “proper” analytic attitude by reject-
ing two of Schleiermacher’s “points of discussion.” Dole outright rejects 
Schleiermacher’s claim that truth for its own sake is foreign to religious 
interests. Dole also rejects Schleiermacher’s insistence that the theologian 
should seek to eliminate the empirical content of their interpretations of 
traditional doctrines in order to isolate and insulate doctrine from scien-
tific inquiry. Dole, correctly, sees these points as overly restrictive.
In the essays of part three, the sources of theology are discussed. Here 
again the question arises as to what should count as analytic theology. As 
Rea suggests in his introduction, philosophy of theology can be analytic 
theology. In “On Understanding Scripture as the Word of God,” Thomas 
McCall opens the third part of the book taking an analytic approach to 
understanding Karl Barth’s conception of scripture as the word of God. 
McCall argues that speech-act theory offers a “charitable and sensible” ac-
count of Barth’s proposal. Furthermore, based on Barth’s own insistence on 
the centrality of Christ for our understanding of divine revelation, McCall 
argues that one who is sympathetic to Barth’s proposal should accept the 
“classical” view of scripture as the word of God regardless of Barth’s own 
objections. In keeping with traditional Christology, speech-act theory can 
allow for a nuanced approach to scripture as both object and encounter. 
McCall’s discussion is a good example of historical theology from an ana-
lytic approach, as were many of the essays in part two.
On the other hand, the next three essays clearly fall outside analytic the-
ology as it is represented. In “On Believing that the Scriptures are Divinely 
Inspired,” Thomas Crisp takes up the question of the divine inspiration 
of scripture. However, in his discussion of “preliminaries,” Crisp passes 
over most if not all the traditional theological issues associated with the 
doctrine. Instead, he argues that such belief is justified on the grounds 
of authoritative testimony. In like manner, in “The Contribution of Reli-
gious Experience to Dogmatic Theology,” Michael Sudduth focuses on the 
justificatory significance of religious experience for grounding theological 
belief. Sudduth argues that since religious experience is inextricably inter-
twined with natural theology, and natural theology makes important con-
tributions to the task of dogmatic theology, religious experience must also 
make important contributions to dogmatic theology. Lastly, in “Science 
and Religion in Constructive Engagement,” Michael Murray argues that 
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theologians must be open to the advancements of science while under-
standing that traditional religious doctrines have empirical consequences. 
Murray sees science and religion as working together to produce a unified, 
scientifically literate and theologically informed explanation of the world 
and our place in it.
My point here is not that all four of the essays in part three should be 
pieces of analytic theology while only the first essay actually is. Instead, 
the fine distinction between McCall’s essay and the others in part three 
exemplify the difficulty of establishing the referent of “analytical theol-
ogy.” The problem is amplified in the last part of the book where critiques, 
alternatives, and emendations to the analytic approach are offered. In the 
essays of part four, beginning with “Hermeneutics and Holiness,” Merold 
Westphal discusses an alternative to analytic theology based on continen-
tal traditions, whereas Eleonore Stump in “The Problem of Evil: Analytic 
Philosophy and Narrative” and Sarah Coakley in “Dark Contemplation 
and Epistemic Transformation: The Analytic Theologian Re-Meets Teresa 
of Avila” both offer what can be seen as needed correctives to an analytic 
approach. If Stump and Coakley are presenting ways of doing analytic 
theology, the vague borders of the enterprise lie both between analytic 
theology and analytic philosophy of religion and the like, as well as be-
tween analytic and modern theology.
Stump criticizes analytic theology for not being able to accommodate 
the nuances and complexities of narrative and story as ways of convey-
ing knowledge. Since narrative is predominant in Christian scripture, she 
concludes, an analytic approach to theology will be ineffectual in convey-
ing the truths contained in scripture. Stump suggests instead a method 
that brings together philosophy and literary criticism. However, the philo-
sophical investigations she describes are amenable to an analytic approach 
in the metaphysical sense. If analytic theology is to be broadly understood 
as the application of the tools, skills and attitudes of analytic philosophy 
to the questions and content of theology, I don’t see why Stump’s method 
of philosophical literary criticism applied to theology could not be a form 
of analytic theology.
Coakley sees analytic theology failing with respect to contemplative 
practices and apophatic, or negating, language. She sees a feminist com-
mitment as a helpful corrective to analytic theology. She describes her es-
say as an attempt to “nudge creatively beyond” the distinction between 
analytic and continental philosophy. Coakley continues: “In the spirit of 
the ‘analytic theology’ which this volume celebrates, the aim [of the present 
chapter] is to do richer justice hermeneutically to the texts of mystical theol-
ogy than the analytic school of philosophy of religion has so far achieved, 
whilst retaining those traits of clarity and apologetic purpose which have 
been its positive hallmarks” (282). Generalizing beyond mystical theology, 
perhaps this is, and should be, the goal of analytic theology on the whole.
What analytic theology will look like as its methods are further em-
ployed is not presently known. This much seems clear by the general and 
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open-ended, even apophatic, discussions in the collection. A concluding 
remark by Stump is fitting here. “The appropriate conclusion to any argu-
ment for a methodology ought to be the employment of it” (263). I look 
forward to the work of analytic theology that is sure to be produced in the 
future. Whatever may constitute analytic theology, and how successful it 
can be, will be discovered only as the discipline is pursued.
The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, ed. Mark 
C. Baker and Stewart Goetz. New York: Continuum Books, 2011. Pp. 287. 
$19.95 (paperback).
C. STEPHEN EVANS, Baylor University
The Soul Hypothesis contains a set of state-of-the-art papers in philosophy 
of mind defending substance dualism. Although the book is an edited col-
lection, unlike many such collections, it is tightly focused, and very well 
organized. The essays complement each other very well, and later essays 
refer to and build on points in earlier essays. Thus, in many ways the book 
contains something approaching a sustained argument.
It is not quite a sustained argument for a single view, however. Although 
all the authors are substance dualists of some kind, there are interesting 
differences in the kinds of dualism they defend. Indeed, one of the major 
theses of the book is that there are a range of positions that can usefully be 
described as substance dualism. One can usefully categorize dualisms by 
the degree to which they see the non-material soul as independent of the 
body and the degree to which they see the soul as differing from the body 
or other material objects. At one extreme, one might see Plato and (some-
what less extreme) Descartes, while at the other extreme one might place 
two of the authors in this volume: William Hasker, with his well-known 
“emergent dualism,” which holds that the mind is causally generated by 
the brain but nevertheless is a distinct entity, and Robin Collins, who holds 
a “dual-aspect” view of the soul, which attributes to it both physical and 
non-physical properties.
Along the way, various authors present many standard, well-recognized 
arguments for dualism (and critiques of materialism, which are often 
closely linked), such as the “unity of consciousness” argument and argu-
ments from the irreducibility of qualia. However, one of the interesting 
features of this book is that several of the authors believe that empirical 
and even scientific data are relevant to the arguments about dualism. They 
try to show that dualism, contrary to the dismissive charges of materialists, 
is not only fully compatible with recent scientific work, but actually may 
be given support by scientific considerations. Along the way suggestions 
are made as to how dualism could be tested, and how it could generate a 
scientific research program.
